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INTRODUCTION 
“Reasonable and articulable suspicion” is generally 
understood as the Fourth Amendment standard the Supreme 
Court chose in Terry v. Ohio1
                                                                                                                                  
 *  George R. Ward Associate Professor of Law, UNC School of Law. My research 
assistants, Lorelle Babwah, Andrew Kasper, and Matthew Nigriny provided invaluable 
assistance. Christopher Slobogin, Ronald Wright, Donald Dripps, Dan Markel, and my 
UNC faculty colleagues improved the article with thoughtful advice. 
 as the basis for brief investigative 
stops by police officers. Articulable suspicion is a lawyer’s 
 1 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
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standard. Judgesand lawyers generally—are partial to words, 
which are their stock-in-trade. But much of what matters to 
people in the world is incredibly difficult to reduce to language. 
Moreover, many people, including some otherwise talented police 
officers, may lack the linguistic capacity to successfully recount 
their experiences in language that lawyers and judges can use in 
court. This Article considers the portion of the “totality of the 
circumstances” that lies beyond the articulable, exploring the 
limitations of witness testimony regarding fast-moving events, 
and the ways in which technology will alter the margins of 
practice on the street and in the courtroom. 
As this Article is being written, the background 
understandings of human cognition and its effect on police 
practice are shifting. Emerging science on cognitive processes is 
introducing new challenges into the courtroom. On the one hand, 
some social scientists are explaining human behavior in ways that 
make it possible for law enforcement officers to translate their 
heretofore inarticulable experiences into words. On the other, the 
findings of other scientists who study the nature of expertise 
suggest that the traditional Terry inquiry, with its focus on 
conscious thought, may be missing much of the picture. Expert 
police officers process much of the critical information on which 
they rely at a subconscious—and therefore inarticulable—level. 
The better they get at their job, the less likely they are to make 
conscious note of classes of information, especially in the 
potentially life-threatening situations that may lead to frisks for 
weapons. Additionally, the process of preparing for the Terry test 
may be driving some information out of police officers’ memories, 
at the same time it seeks to capture other information. Police 
officers, as much as, and perhaps more than other eyewitnesses, 
are susceptible to verbal displacement. 
And officer memory may not be the best evidence available. 
In the twenty-first century, digital recorders are proliferating—
they can be found in police cars, on officers’ lapels, on witness cell 
phones, in retail security systems, the list expands daily. These 
technological advances are making it possible for many officers, 
and many suspects, to bring video or audio recordings of their 
experiences to court. Fourth Amendment doctrine must explicitly 
make room for these technological advances. If, as this Article 
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argues, “reasonable and articulable” suspicion is really a subset of 
“reasonable suspicion based on credible evidence,” then digital 
video and audio recordings should serve as a new, affordable, and 
widely available adjunct to officer testimony that fits nicely into 
this broader doctrinal framework. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines briefly 
the legal regime established by the Supreme Court and commonly 
referred to by the name of the seminal case, Terry v. Ohio, and 
suggests that the totality-of-the-circumstances approach adopted 
by the Court is broader than the traditional “reasonable and 
articulable suspicion” formulation.2 Part II examines some of the 
developments in cognitive science that have implications for the 
application of the Terry standard. It examines new law 
enforcement applications of the emerging science of precognitive 
facial expression, which makes the previously inarticulable 
articulable. This new application is changing the landscape 
underneath Terry. It then looks at the naturalistic decision-
making literature, a branch of psychology of expertise, and 
suggests that Terry may be asking a question that is poorly suited 
to the environment in which officers operate, and to the nature of 
their expertise. It finally considers some recent research on 
witness memory, and suggests that the process of preparing to 
meet the Terry standard may be introducing to the courtroom 
inaccuracies that are real, albeit difficult to quantify. Part III 
briefly considers some of the policy implications of the interaction 
between cognitive science and police conduct under the Terry 
regime. It suggests that the protection offered under the Terry 
standard may be slowly eroding, even as its presence may be 
creating a false sense of confidence that “the courts” are the 
answer to the age-old query, “Who watches the watchers?”3
                                                                                                                                  
 2 Id. 
 Part 
IV considers the viability of digital video as an adjunct to or 
substitute for officer testimony. We may have a new answer to 
who watches: the digital video camera. 
 3 Commonly attributed to the plays of Juvenal, the question in Latin is Quis 
custodies ipsos custodiet. 
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I. TERRY AND REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION 
The language “reasonable and articulable suspicion” is 
immediately familiar to any student of criminal procedure.4 It is 
the Fourth Amendment standard5 articulated by the Supreme 
Court in the Terry line of cases as the minimum basis required for 
brief investigative stops by police officers. These brief, 
investigative “Terry stops”6 are police-citizen encounters short of a 
full arrest, but where appropriate they may include a “frisk” for 
weapons.7 As this Section will show, the courts have given 
increasing deference to the police regarding the bases for such 
stops, but they have retained their prerogative to review police 
behavior, even if the standard is more deferential than probable 
cause. “The stop and frisk rule permits the police to engage in 
what most people regard as reasonable and essential law 
enforcement activity but requires them to pay attention to all of 
the circumstances they confront and to articulate a reason for 
their actions that may be judicially reviewed.”8
Courts applying the Terry standard in its current state of 
evolution may consider a broad range of suspect conduct, such as 
nervousness, evasive behavior, flight, and responses to questions.
 
9
In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts do 
not have available empirical studies dealing with 
inferences from suspicious behavior, and this Court cannot 
reasonably demand scientific certainty where none exists. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 4 For an excellent discussion of the rise of the Terry standard, see Stephen A. 
Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio: A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 911 
(1998). 
 5 The Fourth Amendment states, in full: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S CONST. amend. IV. 
 6 See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 9.1 (4th ed. 2009). 
 7 A frisk is a limited pat-down of the outer clothing of a suspect to check for 
weapons. Id. at 5. If an object that might be a weapon is felt under a suspect’s clothing, 
it can be removed for visual examination. Id. 
 8 Salzburg, supra note 4, at 962. 
 9 LAFAVE, supra note 6. 
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Thus, the reasonable suspicion determination must be 
based on commonsense judgments and inferences about 
human behavior.10
In Terry itself, Martin McFadden, a police officer with thirty-nine 
years of experience as a Cleveland police officer, observed three 
men who were, in his estimate, “casing a job, a stick-up.”
 
11 
McFadden described the elaborate sequence of events in which the 
men walked back and forth in front of a store for ten to twelve 
minutes, and stopped on the corner to talk with a third man, 
before returning to once again stare into the window.12 The police 
officer stopped the men, and asked them some questions.13 
Worried for his safety, he quickly frisked the men for weapons by 
patting down their outer clothing, and felt concealed firearms on 
two of them.14 The men were arrested and convicted on weapons 
charges.15
Terry’s appeal was based on the absence of probable cause to 
arrest him.
 
16 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Warren, 
agreed, but held that the absence of probable cause was not the 
end of the inquiry.17 The government argued that such 
encountersbecause they fell short of full arrestwere outside 
the purview of the Fourth Amendment.18
entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action 
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer 
on the beat—which historically has not been, and as a 
practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant 
procedure.
 Justice Warren wrote 
that the Fourth Amendment did apply, but that there was an 
19
                                                                                                                                  
 10 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 119 (2000). 
 Instead, the conduct . . . must be tested by the 
 11 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6 (1968) (quoting McFadden’s testimony). 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 6-7. 
 14 Id. at 7. 
 15 Id. at 8. 
 16 Id. at 25. 
 17 Id. at 20. 
 18 Id. at 10. 
 19 Id. at 20. 
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Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.20
The Court further held that the standard was objective, not based 
on the officer’s subjective good faith.
 
21 Judged after the fact, the 
circumstances must be those that would have led a reasonable 
person to believe that the stop and frisk were warranted.22 Given 
the suspicious behavior that Officer McFadden observed, he was 
justified in making a brief investigative stop.23 Moreover, the 
limited search for weapons that he conducted was reasonable 
under the circumstances.24
Cases since Terry have referred to the standard as requiring 
reasonable and articulable suspicion.
 
25 The officer must be acting 
on more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
‘hunch’”26 of criminal activity, but may bring experience and 
training to bear to allow seemingly innocuous information to be 
considered as part of the totality of the circumstances. Terry was 
originally framed as a narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment 
requirement that officers have probable cause before searching or 
seizing a person or property.27 In Terry, the Supreme Court 
empowered police officers to stop and frisk a suspect if the officer 
had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that “criminal activity 
[was] afoot” and the suspect was armed and dangerous.28
                                                                                                                                  
 20 Id. 
 This 
narrow exception, based on a standard less rigorous than probable 
cause, was substantially expanded in subsequent decisions, 
 21 Id. at 21. 
 22 Id. at 21-22. 
 23 Id. at 23. 
 24 Id. at 28-29. 
 25 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (“In Terry, we held that an officer 
may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when 
the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”). 
Justice Harlan’s language in his Terry concurrence most closely matches the current 
formulation: “Where such a stop is reasonable, however, the right to frisk must be 
immediate and automatic if the reason for the stop is, as here, an articulable suspicion 
of a crime of violence.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring). A Westlaw search 
for the phrase “articulable suspicion” in the allfeds database on August 16, 2010 
yielded more than 3,800 results. A similar search in allcases hits the 10,000 result 
limit. 
 26 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. 
 27 LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 9.1(c). 
 28 Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (alteration to original). 
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leading some commentators to express concern that the exception 
was beginning to swallow the rule.29
Since Terry was decided, the law has evolved in two key 
ways. First, the lower courts have expanded the original scenario, 
involving violent crimes or suspects thought to be armed and 
dangerous, to include crimes that are not inherently violent, such 
as burglaries and drug offenses, and to allow searches of suspects 
in certain cases where there is no direct evidence that the suspect 
is armed or dangerous.
 
30 Second, some observers have argued that 
trial courts have shown a willingness to “unquestioningly accept 
the testimony of police witnesses,” significantly reducing the 
amount of evidence that will meet the standard.31
In a 1994 article, Professor David Harris noted that much of 
the expansion of Terry up to that point had occurred at the trial 
and intermediate appellate court levels, with the Supreme Court 
continuing to characterize Terry as a narrow exception to the 
probable cause requirement.
 
32 However, the Court’s recent Fourth 
Amendment decisions appear to embrace—and arguably even 
expand—the broader conception of Terry previously adopted by 
the lower courts. In two of its most recent Terry decisions, United 
States v. Arvizu33 and Illinois v. Wardlow,34 the Supreme Court 
overturned lower court decisions to suppress evidence based on a 
restrictive view of the scope of Terry.35
                                                                                                                                  
 29 David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1, 5 (1994); Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The 
Gradual But Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOW. L.J. 567, 576-83 (1991); see 
also Michael J. Roth, Note, Berkemer Revisited: Uncovering the Middle Ground 
Between Miranda and the New Terry, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2779, 2800-03 (2009); Jamie 
L. Stulin, Comment, Does Hiibel Redefine Terry? The Latest Expansion of the Terry 
Doctrine and the Silent Impact of Terrorism on the Supreme Court’s Decision to Compel 
Identification, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1456-58 (2005). 
 
 30 Harris, supra note 29, at 23-32. 
 31 Id. at 33. 
 32 Id. at 5-6. 
 33 534 U.S. 266, 268 (2002). 
 34 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000). 
 35 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277 (holding that court below incorrectly suppressed 
evidence from vehicle search, where border patrol officer stopped vehicle after 
observing defendant driving on road frequented by drug smugglers and seeing children 
in back seat waving oddly); Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (holding that Illinois Supreme 
Court incorrectly suppressed evidence obtained during stop and frisk of defendant who 
ran away from police vehicle that was entering high crime area, despite police officer’s 
inability to remember whether police car was marked or unmarked). In a third case, 
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While courts have substantially liberalized their inquiry 
under Terry, it remains an important cornerstone of Fourth 
Amendment law. Other scholars have written extensively on 
Terry.36 It has been variously described as a “practically perfect 
doctrine,” and as a dismal failure.37 It has been described as 
revolutionary, and as evolutionary.38 Others have suggested that 
the balance in Terry itself was correct, but that subsequent 
decisions have tipped the balance in favor of the police,39 and yet 
others suggest that Terry’s strength is that it is flexible enough to 
move back and forth with the times.40
                                                                                                                                  
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court, 542 U.S. 177, 191 (2004), the Court held that a 
state may require a suspect to disclose his name during a Terry stop without violating 
the Fourth Amendment. While the majority maintained that Hiibel was not 
inconsistent with previous Terry decisions, id. at 188, commentators have argued that 
Hiibel diverges from earlier opinions stating that suspects cannot be required to 
answer questions during Terry stops. See Stulin, supra note 29, at 1456-63. One 
notable exception to this trend towards an expansive interpretation of Terry is Florida 
v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), where the Court held that an “anonymous tip that a 
person is carrying a gun, is, without more, [in]sufficient to justify a police officer’s stop 
and frisk of that person.” Id. at 268. 
 Other critics have noted 
 36 See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, Two Hundred Years of Individual Liberties: Essays 
on the Bill of Rights: Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth 
Amendment “Seizures”?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729 (1991); Christopher Slobogin, Let’s 
Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 1053 (1998); Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: 
The Gradual But Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOW. L.J. 567, 576 (1991) 
(arguing that the Court struck the right balance in Terry but later decisions 
undermined that balance). 
 37 See Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth Amendment is Worse Than the 
Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 35 (1994) (arguing that Terry’s rationale has been 
distorted to justify ever-more intrusive police conduct); Saltzburg, supra note 4, at 912 
(arguing that Terry strikes a “practically perfect” balance). See generally Adina, 
Schwartz, Just Take Away Their Guns: The Hidden Racism of Terry v. Ohio, 23 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 317, 331 (1996) (arguing that Terry weakened the rights of 
defendants of all races when it broadened the basis for admissibility of evidence); Scott 
E. Sundby, An Ode to Probable Cause: A Brief Response to Professors Amar and 
Slobogin, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1133, 1136-37 (1998) (discussing tension between 
individual liberties and police power). 
 38 Slobogin, supra note 36, at 1095 (“Terry didn’t alter law enforcement practices; it 
just provided, in the hands of the post-Warren Court, a rationale for the status quo.”). 
 39 Williams, supra note 36, at 576 (arguing that the Court struck the right balance 
in Terry but later decisions undermined that balance). 
 40 See Craig S. Lerner, Judging Police Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 39-40 
(2007); Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief 
of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 402 (1988) (“[R]easonable suspicion 
became a valid compromise standard that comports with the [F]ourth [A]mendment if 
the Court decides that, after balancing the interests, it is reasonable. The government 
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that different and even contradictory information has been 
accepted by trial courts as an acceptable basis for an investigative 
stop, leading to a perception of oversight, even though the courts 
are simply ratifying officers’ judgments so long as they offer any 
justification for their actions.41
Since Terry was decided, the courts have emphasized that the 
issue is a practical one. In United States v. Cortez,
 
42
Courts have used a variety of terms to capture the elusive 
concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to 
stop a person. Terms like “articulable reasons” and 
“founded suspicion” are not self-defining; they fall short of 
providing clear guidance dispositive of the myriad factual 
situations that arise. But the essence of all that has been 
written is that the totality of the circumstances—the whole 
picture—must be taken into account. Based upon that 
whole picture the detaining officers must have a 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the 
particular person stopped of criminal activity. 
 Chief Justice 
Burger, writing for the majority, emphasized the inherent 
difficulties that come with applying the standard, and also 
recognized that the courts would give deference to the 
particularized training of police officers: 
The idea that an assessment of the whole picture must 
yield a particularized suspicion contains two elements, 
each of which must be present before a stop is permissible. 
First, the assessment must be based upon all of the 
circumstances. The analysis proceeds with various 
objective observations, information from police reports, if 
such are available, and consideration of the modes or 
patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers. From 
these data, a trained officer draws inferences and makes 
deductions—inferences and deductions that might well 
elude an untrained person. 
                                                                                                                                  
no longer argues against a presumed starting point of probable cause but rather argues 
for reasonable suspicion as a reasonable accommodation of competing interests.”). 
 41 Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: “All Seems Infected that th’ Infected 
Spy, As All Looks Yellow to the Jaundic’d Eye,” 65 N.C. L. REV. 417, 444-47 (1987). 
 42 449 U.S. 411 (1981). 
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The process does not deal with hard certainties, but with 
probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was 
articulated as such, practical people formulated certain 
common sense conclusions about human behavior; jurors 
as factfinders are permitted to do the same—and so are 
law enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence thus 
collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library 
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in 
the field of law enforcement. 
The second element contained in the idea that an 
assessment of the whole picture must yield a 
particularized suspicion is the concept that the process just 
described must raise a suspicion that the particular 
individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. Chief 
Justice Warren, speaking for the Court in Terry v. Ohio, 
supra, said that “[t]his demand for specificity in the 
information upon which police action is predicated is the 
central teaching of this Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.”43
II. NEW THINGS TO ARTICULATE WITHIN THE EXISTING 
PARADIGM 
 
A. A Lawyer’s Standard 
Make no mistake; articulable suspicion is a lawyer’s 
standard. Judges—and lawyers generally—have an inherent bias 
in favor of words.44
                                                                                                                                  
 43 Id. at 417-18 (citations omitted) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 
(1968)). 
 Words are the lawyer’s stock-in-trade. 
Ordinarily, experiences that cannot be reduced to words cannot be 
explained in a way that makes them available as evidence in 
court, and they are unreviewable by appellate judges, who depend 
on a written record. Lawyers are trained for years in the art of 
rearranging emotional responses to issues into legal arguments, to 
use the language of the law to reinterpret their prior experience so 
that it fits into the existing structure. One shortcoming inherent 
in a language-based system is that much of what matters to 
 44 See Lerner, supra note 40, at 25 (“The legal system in practice rewards those 
officers who are able and willing to spin their behavior in a way that satisfies judges, 
while it penalizes those officers who are less verbally facile . . . .”). 
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people in the world is incredibly difficult to reduce to language. 
Another is that many people lack the linguistic capacity to cast 
their experiences, no matter how real they have been, in language 
that lawyers and judges can use in court. It naturally creates 
biases in favor of the articulable portion of experience, and the 
articulate portion of the population. 
The world of Terry is undergoing an important change. 
Whether and how much that change will ultimately affect the 
gross number of searches that the courts allow to meet the Terry 
standard remains to be seen. Nonetheless, social scientists such as 
Paul Ekman in the area of facial expression of emotion45 and Ray 
Bull and Aldert Vrij in the science of distinguishing truth from 
lies,46
How many cases this will affect is impossible to predict. Some 
courts already have been willing to accept vague language about 
facial expression and behavior because they understand that 
describing in detail how someone looks and acts can be 
challenging. Paul Ekman and the other social scientists who have 
adopted or adapted his methods for studying human expression 
and emotion have created a system that permits highly specific 
 are creating a scientific framework that makes it possible 
for law enforcement officers to translate their previously 
unexplained experiences into words. Training in their methods 
will make it possible for the police to introduce heretofore 
inaccessible evidence regarding their experiences in court. If 
judges credit the new science, more searches will meet the 
reasonableness threshold. 
                                                                                                                                  
 45 See infra at notes 47-67 and accompanying text; see also PAUL EKMAN, 
EMOTIONS REVEALED: RECOGNIZING FACES AND FEELINGS TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATION 
AND EMOTIONAL LIFE (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter EMOTIONS REVEALED]; PAUL EKMAN, 
TELLING LIES: CLUES TO DECEIT IN THE MARKETPLACE, POLITICS AND MARRIAGE (3d ed. 
2001) [hereinafter TELLING LIES]. Ekman’s work, and its possible applications police 
investigations, has been explored recently in the television series Lie to Me. According 
to his website, he “frequently advises police departments, anti-terrorism groups, and 
animation studios.” See The Truth Behind the Lies: Evening Seminar, SMITHSONIAN 
RESIDENT ASSOCIATES PROGRAM, http://residentassociates.org/ticketing/tickets/ 
reserve.aspx?performanceNumber=219398 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
 46 See, e.g., ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LYING 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE (2000); Aldert Vrij, Criteria-Based 
Content Analysis: A Qualitative Review of the First 37 Studies, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 3 (2005); Aldert Vrij, Katherine Edward & Ray Bull, Stereotypical Verbal and 
Nonverbal Responses While Deceiving Others, 27 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 899 
(2001). 
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description of observed facial expression. Ekman’s system has the 
potential to change the way people, including the police, perceive 
and describe people’s facial expressions. The Facial Action Coding 
System Ekman and Wallace Friesen created has more than fifty 
possible components of an expression.47 The components of an 
expression are created by the contraction of numerous facial 
muscles, some of which most people have conscious control over, 
and some of which most people leave to their autonomic muscles. 
The example Ekman uses is the difference between the “Pan-
American” smile, the say-cheese smile that has appeared in photo 
albums everywhere, looks posed and never reaches the eyes, and a 
genuine smile, which activates different muscles48 around the 
nose and eyes.49
Subject those untrained people to skilled cross-examination 
in a courtroom, and the results will not be pretty. But give them 
some training, and things might change considerably. The officer 
who previously thought something was not right will be able to 
explain what it was that he saw that was not right. Instead of the 
processing taking place subconsciously, it can be moved to the 
conscious level. This has implications under Terry because it will 
allow the basis for suspicion to be articulable. 
 Many people can tell the difference between a 
true smile and a false smile. Far fewer have the training or the 
vocabulary to explain why one was false and the other was not. 
B. The Underlying Scientific Claim: Precognitive Facial 
Expression 
The basic scientific claims underlying the science of 
precognitive facial expression are fairly simple and somewhat 
intuitive. First, basic facial expressions related to human emotion 
are biologically, not socially determined.50 They are “hardwired” 
and are the same across cultures, barring some abnormality.51
                                                                                                                                  
 47 PAUL EKMAN & WALLACE V. FRIESEN, THE FACIAL ACTION CODING SYSTEM 
(1978). 
 
 48 EKMAN, TELLING LIES, supra note 45, at 150-51. 
 49 Errol Morris, The Most Curious Thing, NYTIMES.COM (May 19, 2008 10:56 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/19/the-most-curious-thing/; see also 
EKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED, supra note 45, at 204-12. 
 50 EKMAN, EMOTIONS REVEALED, supra note 45, at 2-14. 
 51 Id. 
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Babies smile when they are happy, not because they have learned 
to smile from watching their parents, but because they have 
instinctive physiological responses.52 Second, people’s emotions 
are revealed on their faces via involuntary muscular contractions, 
and these facial expressions occur precognitively, before the 
individual becomes consciously aware that they are experiencing 
the emotion.53 Once the individual is aware that they are 
experiencing the emotion, they can regain control of their facial 
expressions,54 hence the term “fleeting expression.” There are 
some limits to this. People can artificially limit their facial 
expressions in advance by adopting a “poker face.” While it is hard 
to mask genuine emotions, it is also difficult to voluntarily mimic 
genuine facial expressions of emotion.55 It is hard for most people 
to voluntarily contract a subset of the facial muscles that are 
naturally involved in genuine expressions.56 Because autonomic 
systems control those responses, a smile that comes from genuine 
emotion is in fact different in appearance from a forced smile.57
Perhaps less intuitive is a third claim: with training, most 
people can see and identify the fleeting expressions, and can 
detect and articulate the difference between genuine and forced 
expressions.
 
58 Some people—those with strong intuitive skills—
are very good at this naturally, although they usually lack the 
capacity and the vocabulary to explain what it is they were 
doing.59
The science has a long intellectual history, starting with the 
work of Wallace Friesen,
 
60
                                                                                                                                  
 52 This theory dates back to Darwin’s observations of blind children. 
 and being largely systematized by Paul 
Ekman, a psychologist and professor who created the Facial 
 53 EKMAN, TELLING LIES, supra note 45, at 123-26. 
 54 Id. at 131. 
 55 Id. at 132-33. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 158-60. 
 58 See Paul Ekman et al., A Few Can Catch A Liar, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 263, 263-65 
(1999) (finding that seventy-three percent of federal intelligence and law enforcement 
officers, sixty-seven percent of Los Angeles County sheriffs, and sixty-two percent of 
federal judges could detect a lie after completing training in facial recognition 
methods). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Paul Ekman & Wallace V. Friesen, Nonverbal Leakage and Clues to Deception, 
32 PSYCHIATRY 88 (1969). 
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Action Coding System (“FACS”) for documenting the component 
changes in facial expression.61 Ekman’s work was popularized in 
science writer Malcolm Gladwell’s 2005 bestseller, Blink: The 
Power of Thinking Without Thinking.62 Ekman and some of his 
successors have adapted the methodology and now offer training 
in this science to law enforcement.63
In Blink, Malcolm Gladwell offered a tantalizing glimpse of 
the potential use of the science of facial expression in the 
courtroom when he interviewed Ekman. Ekman chose, as one 
example of his system, videotaped testimony from the murder 
trial of former University of Southern California and Buffalo Bills 
running back O.J. Simpson.
 
64 He dissected the testimony of Brian 
“Kato” Kaelin, an actor who rented Simpson’s pool house and saw 
O.J. Simpson the night that his ex-wife Nicole Brown Simpson 
and Beverly Hills waiter Ronald Goldman were murdered.65
Ekman slipped a tape taken from the O.J. Simpson trial 
into the VCR. It was of Kato Kaelin, Simpson’s shaggy-
haired house guest, being examined by Marcia Clark, one 
of the prosecutors in the case. Kaelin sits in the witness 
box, with his trademark vacant look. Clark asks a hostile 
question. Kaelin leans forward and answers softly. “Did 
you see that?” Ekman asked me. I saw nothing, just Kato 
being Kato—harmless and passive. Ekman stopped the 
 
Kaelin’s testimony regarding Simpson’s whereabouts that night 
and Simpson’s demeanor when he encountered Kaelin shortly 
after the murders was important to the case. As Gladwell explains 
the exercise: 
                                                                                                                                  
 61 EKMAN & FRIESEN, supra note 47. 
 62 MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 197-
214 (2005). 
 63 According to Ekman’s website, he “frequently advises police departments, anti-
terrorism groups, and animation studios.” See See The Truth Behind the Lies: Evening 
Seminar, SMITHSONIAN RESIDENT ASSOCIATES PROGRAM, http://residentassociates.org/ 
ticketing/tickets/reserve.aspx?performanceNumber=219398 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
Customs officials report that after receiving training from Ekman their “hit rate” for 
finding drugs during passenger searches increased to 22.5 percent from 4.2 percent in 
1998. Bob Burns, The Truth Behind the Title: Behavior Detection Officer, THE TSA 
BLOG (Feb. 29, 2008 4:12 PM), http://blog.tsa.gov/2008/02/truth-behind-title-behavior-
detection.html. 
 64 GLADWELL, supra note 62, at 211. 
 65 Id. 
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tape, rewound it, and played it back in slow motion. On the 
screen, Kaelin moved forward to answer the question, and 
in that fraction of a second his face was utterly 
transformed. His nose wrinkled, as he flexed his levator 
labii superioris, alaeque nasi. His teeth were bared, his 
brows lowered. “It was almost totally A.U. nine,” Ekman 
said. “It’s disgust, with anger there as well, and the clue to 
that is that when your eyebrows go down, typically your 
eyes are not as open as they are here. The raised upper 
eyelid is a component of anger, not disgust. It’s very quick.” 
Ekman stopped the tape and played it again, peering at 
the screen. “You know, he looks like a snarling dog.” 
Ekman said that there was nothing magical about his 
ability to pick up an emotion that fleeting. It was simply a 
matter of practice. “I could show you forty examples, and 
you could pick it up. I have a training tape, and people love 
it. They start it, and they can’t see any of these 
expressions. Thirty-five minutes later, they can see them 
all. What that says is that this is an accessible skill.”66
And some police are now training to access that skill. As they do 




C. A Common Fact Pattern 
 
Ekman’s work may be giving new answers to old questions: 
How do good cops explain what they are doing and why they are 
doing it to those of us who have never been there? How is 
expertise in criminal behavior and the patterns of street conduct 
translated into language accessible by the courts? To help work 
through the practical implications, consider the following fact 
pattern: Imagine for a moment a police officer passing an 
                                                                                                                                  
 66 Id. 
 67 It also may lead to more searching than civil libertarians might be comfortable 
with, if it ever became a permissible sole basis for a Terry stop. And it has the potential 
to make already bad situations even worse, if we widely accept these new techniques, 
and give bad cops something new, and fundamentally unfalsifiable, to say in court. For 
the bad cops, it may make very little difference because they will lie to meet the legal 
standard no matter what it is. However, it may give them something to say when 
cameras capture many aspects of a situation but miss the suspect’s face. 
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individual on a crowded street late one summer night, in a bar 
district he regularly patrols on foot. Something about the 
individual he just passed strikes a chord in him somewhere, but 
he is not sure why. His instincts, honed by years on the street, 
ring an alarm bell and are screaming danger. He cannot articulate 
a reason. The man is dressed normally, although he is wearing a 
loose jacket with a bulge under his arm. His clothing is out of 
place for the area, which is a nightclub district, and the weather is 
warm. He is walking oddly, but that is not enough to have set off 
the officer’s instincts. His face was wrong, but he can’t explain 
what about it made him react. The man clearly appears to be 
looking for someone. He watches the man’s back a little while 
longer. He imagines having to explain to his sergeant and to the 
courts later why he stopped the man and decides that he does not 
have enough information to explain why he made a stop, so he 
proceeds on his way. Twenty minutes later, the man shoots and 
kills his estranged wife. Did this officer do the right thing? 
Now re-imagine the same scenario. At the moment the alarm 
bells are triggered in his head, the police officer reacts to his 
instinct and stops the man. He attempts to ask him questions, but 
the man says “If you’re arresting me, arrest me, if you’re not, leave 
me alone. I know my rights.” After this very brief conversation, 
the officer cannot shake the feeling that the man is dangerous. 
The bulge that he noticed in the man’s jacket is too indistinct for 
him to say what is in it. Although he cannot say why, he is 
convinced the man is dangerous. He tells the man to put his hands 
on top of his head, leans him against the wall, and frisks him. It 
turns out he is carrying a concealed weapon—a handgun, in a 
shoulder holster. The officer takes the man’s gun, handcuffs him, 
and takes his wallet out of his pocket to identify him. He radios 
the station for information on the man, based on the ID he finds in 
his wallet. It turns out that the man is a convicted felon with a 
history of spousal battery who is under a current domestic 
violence restraining order. Further investigation reveals that his 
estranged wife was out with a date at a nightclub three blocks 
from the location where the man was stopped. In this jurisdiction, 
it is a crime to carry a concealed weapon while subject to a 
domestic violence restraining order, so the officer arrests the man. 
Did this officer do the right thing? What he did was 
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unconstitutional under current doctrine, and the handgun would 
almost certainly be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. 
Let us imagine the same scenario again. This time, the officer 
finds a flashlight in the man’s coat pocket, not a concealed 
weapon. The officer takes the man’s ID as before, writes down his 
name, apologizes for the inconvenience, and leaves.68
Now let us once again imagine this scenario differently, in a 
world where police have extensive training in behavioral 
observation and a new technique—precognitive facial expression 
analysis, a form of applied cognitive psychology. Now, when he is 
asked about what he saw, the officer says that when he looked 
into the man’s face as he was approaching him on the street, he 
saw a series of microexpressions or “emblematic slips.” These 
microexpressions included anger and disgust as the man looked at 
women passing him on the street and mingled fear and disgust 
when he saw the police officer.
 Did this 
officer do the right thing? 
69
                                                                                                                                  
 68 Cf. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 43, 63 
(2009) (noting that only one out of ten individuals stopped and frisked by the New York 
Police Department in 2006 were arrested or served summons); Christopher Slobogin, 
Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 374 n.34 
(1999) (noting that only one out of one-hundred people stopped by New Orleans police 
officers in the late 1960s were prosecuted). 
 The officer explains how he was 
able to do so, based on his training in precognitive facial 
expression. The officer explains that he has been trained that 
there are fleeting facial expressions that appear in response to 
environmental stimuli, and that these expressions occur 
precognitively, before the individual is aware of them and 
consciously asserts control over his facial muscles. Because they 
are instinctive and precognitive, they are very effective indicators 
of a person’s genuine emotion. In addition, the man’s behavior was 
consistent with hunting for someone, not simply strolling down 
the street. He was rapidly scanning the crowd, checking faces, 
dismissing them, and continuing down the street. He appeared to 
be hyper-alert, in an area where most people were relaxed and 
 69 Of course, people may fear or distrust the police for many reasons. See, e.g., 
Lenese Herbert, Othello Error: Facial Profiling, Privacy, and the Suppression of 
Dissent, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79 (2007); Andrew E. Taslitz, Police Are People Too: 
Cognitive Obstacles to, and Opportunities for, Police Getting the Individualized 
Suspicion Judgment Right, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 10-12. 
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having a good time. The officer stops and frisks the suspect based 
on these criteria. 
Is this enough to change the balance? That will depend in 
part on the interaction between the legal standard—”reasonable 
and articulable suspicion” and judicial consumption of the police 
officer’s training in the new methods. Social scientists who study 
human expression and emotion have created the language that 
will permit translation of police experience into words. We can 
expect a shift from cop-speak terms like “there was something 
‘hinky’70
D. The Nose of the Camel—TSA Adopts SPOT 
 about the guy” (a statement which in this author’s 
experience has drawn nods from experienced law enforcement 
officers across the country but will draw frowns from judges) to 
“his precognitive affect was inconsistent with his surroundings.” 
This statement is scientifically sound, almost impossible to falsify, 
will include embedded value judgments about what human 
emotions should be showing on a person’s face in a given context, 
and may lead to more searching than we are comfortable with if it 
becomes a permissible sole basis for a Terry stop. 
The use of the science of precognitive facial expression in law 
enforcement is no hypothetical—it has arrived. If someone has 
flown into a major airport in the United States in the last three 
years, odds are that it has been applied to them or their traveling 
companions.71 Screeners for the Transportation Safety Authority 
(TSA) have been applying behavioral observation techniques 
based on this science under the acronym SPOT (Screening 
Passengers by Observation Technique).72
                                                                                                                                  
 70 See Hinky Definition, URBANDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.urbandictionary.com/ 
define.php?term=hinky (visited Nov. 1, 2010) (defining hinky as 1) “Something as yet 
undefinable is wrong, out of place; not quite right. There’s something hinky about the 
deal[,]” or 2) “A cop’s version of “I’ve a bad feeling about that.”). 
 The techniques are 
based on behavior, so in theory they avoid the potential for bias 
 71 See Behavior Detection Officers (BDO): Layers of Security, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/bdo/index.shtm (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) 
(noting that behavior detection officers (BDOs) currently are deployed at 161 airports 
in the United States). 
 72 See BDOs SPOT More Than Just Opportunities at TSA: News & Happenings, 
TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., (May 8, 2007), http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/ 
boston_bdo_spot.shtm. 
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that existed in profiles based on immutable characteristics.73
Kip Hawley, the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security 
described the techniques as follows: 
 
Whether the immutable characteristics may be used more subtly, 
for example in selecting whom to observe in the first instance, is 
an open question. 
We use a system of behavior observation that is based on 
the science that demonstrates that there are certain 
involuntary, subconscious actions that can betray a 
person’s hostile intent. For instance, there are tiny—but 
noticeable to the trained person—movements in a person’s 
facial muscles when they have certain emotions. It is very 
different from the stress we all show when we’re anxious 
about missing the flight due to, say, a long security line. 
This is true across race, gender, age, ethnicity, etc. It is our 
way of not falling into the trap where we predict what a 
terrorist is going to look like. We know they use people 
who “look like” terrorists, but they also use people who do 
not, perhaps thinking that we cue only off of what the 9/11 
hijackers looked like. 
Our Behavior Detection teams routinely—and quietly—
identify problem people just through observable behavior 
cues. More than 150 people have been identified by our 
teams, turned over to law enforcement, and subsequently 
arrested. This layer is invisible to the public, but don’t 
                                                                                                                                  
 73 In testimony before Congress, Assistant TSA Secretary Kip Hawley described it 
this way: 
We have deployed hundreds of BDOs at the 40 busiest airports as part of the 
Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT) program. The SPOT 
program uses nonintrusive behavior observation and analysis techniques to 
identify potentially high-risk passengers based solely on their exhibited 
behavior. BDOs are trained to detect individuals exhibiting behaviors that 
indicate they may be a threat. The program is a derivative of other successful 
behavioral analysis programs that have been employed by law enforcement 
and security personnel both in the U.S. and around the world. 
See Kip Hawley, Assistant Sec’y, Transp. Sec. Admin., Statement Before the United 
States House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
Subcommittee on Aviation (July 24, 2008), available at http://www.tsa.gov/ 
press/speeches/072408_hawley_aviation_security.shtm. Some critics are convinced that 
even behavior-based programs will lead to discrimination against minorities. See 
generally Herbert, supra note 69. 
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discount it, because it may be the most effective. We 
publicize non-terrorist-related successes like a murder 
suspect caught in Minneapolis and a bank robber caught in 
Philadelphia. 
Most common are people showing phony documents, but 
we have even picked out undercover operatives—including 
our own. One individual, identified by a TSO in late May 
and not allowed to fly, was killed in a police shoot-out five 
days later. Additionally, several individuals have been of 
interest from the counter-terrorism perspective. With just 
this limited deployment of Behavior Detection Officers 
(BDOs), we have identified more people of 
counterterrorism interest than all the people combined 
caught with prohibited items. Look for us to continue to 
look at ways that highlight problem people rather than 
just problem objects.74
TSA is not alone. The techniques adopted by the agency are 
based on the experiences of other law enforcement agencies.
 
75
III. SOME HIDDEN FLAWS OF THE TERRY PARADIGM 
 As 
the agencies and agents talk to each other, the science of facial 
expression will inevitably work its way into the courtroom. 
Collectively, society will have to answer some new questions: 
What weight should courts give to the new training in the context 
of reasonable and articulable suspicion? How do we as society 
want police to react under the circumstances outlined above? 
What are the risks to permitting the police to rely on this newly 
articulated way of explaining their “street sense”? What are the 
risks if we fail to do so? 
Psychological research suggests some additional problems 
that are inherent in the current paradigm. First, psychologists 
who study the nature of expert decision-making suggest that 
police officers may not be fully aware of much of the information 
                                                                                                                                  
 74 Interview by Bruce Schneier with Kip Hawley, Assistant Sec’y, Transp. Sec. 
Admin. (July 30, 2007), available at http://www.schneier.com/interview-hawley.html. 
 75 See Burns, supra note 63 (noting that Ekman had previously worked with 
Customs and Border Protection, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and other government agencies). 
2012] CHALLENGES TO TERRY 957 
on which they rely at the time they are using it.76 Second, 
research into the nature of memory itself suggests that by 
requiring officers to write reports and prepare testimony to match 
a particular standard, the system may be irrevocably tampering 
with the officers’ memory.77
A. Naturalistic Decision Making 
 I consider each of these claims in 
turn. 
At least some of the dissatisfaction with the Terry standard 
on the law enforcement side is based on a fundamental mismatch 
between the way emergency responders, such as police officers, 
and lawyers think. It seems unlikely the Terry standard 
adequately reflects the reality of the practice of experienced police 
officers. Research into the way experts perform their jobs in other 
disciplines that require rapid reaction to changing circumstances 
in a stress-filled environment—firefighters, military officers, and 
jet pilots—has shown that decisions like these are not the product 
of the type of analysis in which judges and lawyers routinely 
engage.78
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) is the term for a new 
field of applied psychological research. NDM “seeks explicitly to 
understand how people handle complex tasks and environments. 
Instead of trying to reduce these to variables that can be studied 
at leisure, NDM examines the phenomena themselves in the 
context of the situations where they are found . . . .”
 Simply put, the officer on the street is engaged in a 
different kind of thinking than a judge on the bench. 
79
                                                                                                                                  
 76 Anthony J. Pinizzotto et al., Intuitive Policing: Emotional/Rational Decision-
Making in Law Enforcement, 73 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., 1, 2-3 (Feb. 2004). 
 
 77 Cf. Bennett L. Gershman, Witness Coaching by Prosecutors, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
829, 839 (2002) (“Whereas witness preparation certainly can assist a witness in 
remembering and retrieving a truthful recollection, preparation can also distort a 
witness’s underlying memory and produce a false recollection.”). 
 78 See Gary Klein et al., Rapid Decision-Making on the Fire Ground: The Original 
Study Plus a Postscript, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE HUMAN FACTORS SOCIETY 30TH 
ANNUAL MEETING 576 (1986) (firefighters); George L. Kaempf et al., Decision-Making 
in Complex Naval Command-and-Control Environments, 38 HUMAN FACTORS 220 
(1996) (naval officers); PETER A. SIMPSON, NATURALISTIC DECISION MAKING IN 
AVIATION ENVIRONMENTS (2001), available at http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/ 
bitstream/1947/3813/1/DSTO-GD-0279%20PR.pdf (jet pilots). 
 79 Eduardo Salas and Gary Klein, Expertise and Naturalistic Decision Making: An 
Overview, in LINKING EXPERTISE AND NATURALISTIC DECISION MAKING 3 (2001). 
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Decision researchers such as Gary Klein, Roberta 
Calderwood, and Anne Clinton-Cirocco call the process that 
experts acting in these stressful conditions engage in “recognition-
primed decisionmaking.”80 In these situations, experts do not 
carefully choose among a series of generated alternatives. Instead, 
they rapidly pattern match, looking for an experience that fits the 
situation.81
Many researchers are now advocating for a dual-system 
mode of thinking. The automatic system is fast, automatic, 
effortless and emotional, and uses tacit knowledge. The 
reflective system is slower, conscious, effortful, deliberate, 
logical and serial, and uses explicit knowledge. These two 
systems, which work in different ways, complement each 
other . . . .” 
 We may be missing the big picture altogether by 
requiring explicit knowledge as the basis for a constitutional stop. 
According to Klein: 
82
And these two systems do not easily connect to each other.
 
83
Return to the hypothetical officer observing the suspect on 
the street. Imagine that instead of the officer observing 
everything, a camera worn by the officer records it. The same 
information that was available to the camera is now available to 
his supervisor, the prosecutor, the judge, and ultimately the jury. 
Ironically, much of the information that they will be processing 
may not be available to the officer, at least not consciously. While 
he is on the street, in the danger zone, if his instincts suggest 
something is wrong, and that the suspect may be dangerous, his 
focus may change. Instead of closely watching the suspect’s face, 
at least consciously, his focus may change to the suspect’s hands 
 It is 
not hard to imagine that they also reflect the difference between 
the systems that take precedence for a police officer on the street, 
deciding whether he or the public is at risk, and for a prosecutor 
or judge in the office trying to decide whether that decision meets 
the Terry standard. 
                                                                                                                                  
 80 Klein, supra note 78. 
 81 Id. 
 82 GARY KLEIN, STREETLIGHTS AND SHADOWS: SEARCHING FOR THE KEYS TO 
ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKING 93 (2009). 
 83 Id. 
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and to the clothing where weapons may be hidden. His 
subconscious mind may be processing all of the details that we are 
watching on camera, but his attention is focused down on only a 
few things. This attention limitation may mean that, at times, the 
officer will have less accessible to him than we might expect when 
he is called upon to testify in court about the basis of his actions.84
B. Constructed Memory and Verbal Overshadowing: Going 
From That’s How It Must Have Happened to That’s How It Did 
Happen 
 
Constructed memory is one of the concerns that attorneys 
must grapple with for all witnesses.85 Memory is not a fixed point, 
and it is constructed, and reconstructed, from the moment of the 
event to the moment of recall on the witness stand. Many readers 
of this Article have a memory of themselves involved in some 
significant event—a birthday party, Christmas, a wedding—where 
they can see themselves engaged in the activity in their mind’s 
eye. This third-person view of the event is both real and an 
artifact. Barring an out-of-body experience, it is unlikely that the 
person with such a memory truly saw themselves that way. The 
image may well come from a photograph, or a video, or some other 
reconstruction based on family stories, fragmentary memories, 
and the rest of the memory is filled in around it. It may contain 
many important and accurate details, such as who was present, 
what was received, how one felt, but the image has become part of 
the memory in such a way that it is intertwined in one’s mind.86
Advances in memory research show that there are multiple 
paths in which a witness can develop a real but false memory.
 
87
                                                                                                                                  
 84 See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of replacing the 
hypothetical camera with a real one. 
 
Factors such as stress and gap-filling can affect the acquisition of 
 85 See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Memory for People and 
Events, in 11 HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY: FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 149, 150 (Alan M. 
Goldstein ed., 2003). 
 86 See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Memory Faults and Fixes, 18 ISSUES IN SCI. & TECH. 42 
(2002). 
 87 FREDERICK CHARLES BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY IN EXPERIMENTAL AND 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997); ELIZABETH LOFTUS & KATHERINE 
KETCHAM, THE MYTH OF REPRESSED MEMORY (1994). 
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information.88 Stress and the post-event misinformation effect can 
also alter memories after they have been initially encoded, and 
memories can be significantly affected by the passage of time.89
“People integrate new materials into their memory, 
modifying what they believe they personally experienced. When 
people combine information gathered at the time of an actual 
experience with information acquired later, they form a smooth 
and seamless memory and thereafter have great difficulty telling 
which facts came from which time.”
 
90
It gets worse. Post-event suggestion, which may include new 
information from other witnesses, photos, records, reports, or even 
leading questions, often does more than refresh and bolster a 
fading memory.
 
91 It can create entirely new, and entirely false, 
memories.92 Many of the criticisms of hypnotically induced 
memory, for example, are based on this phenomenon.93 Memory 
researchers have been able to successfully implant genuinely 
believed but entirely false memories, demonstrating clinically that 
this phenomenon exists.94
                                                                                                                                  
 88 Wells & Loftus, supra note 85, at 150. 
 
 89 Id. 
 90 Loftus, supra note 86, at 43. Legal scholars have considered the dangers in the 
context of all witness preparation. See also Mirjan Damaska, Presentation of Evidence 
and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1083, 1094 (1975) (“During the sessions 
devoted to “coaching,” the future witness is likely to try to adapt himself to 
expectations mirrored in the interviewer’s one-sided attitude. As a consequence, gaps 
in his memory may even unconsciously be filled out by what he thinks accords with the 
lawyer’s expectations and are in tune with his thesis. Later, in court, these additions to 
memory images may appear to the witness himself as accurate reproductions of his 
original perceptions.”). 
 91 Loftus, supra note 86, at 43. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See, e.g., Amanda J. Barnier & Kevin M. McConkey, Reports of Real and False 
Memories: The Relevance of Hypnosis, Hypnotizability, and Context of Memory Test, 
101 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 521, 521-27 (1992) (comparing studies of the factors 
affecting false memory, including hypnosis). 
 94 D.S. Lindsay et al., True Photographs and False Memories, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 149 
(2004) (discussing implanted false memories of being hospitalized overnight for an ear 
infection, spilling a punch bowl on the bride’s parents at a wedding, getting one’s hand 
caught in a mousetrap, hiding the toy slime in the teacher’s desk, and witnessing a 
demonic possession); Elizabeth Loftus & Jacqueline Pickrell, The Formation of False 
Memories, 25 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 720, 720-21 (1995) (experimentally implanting false 
memories of being lost in a shopping mall as a young child); Giuliana Mazzoni & 
Amina Memon, Imagination Can Create False Autobiographical Memories, 14 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 186 (2003). 
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Moreover, witness confidence in the quality of the memory 
can increase as the officer prepares for trial, even as the 
contamination increases.95
Postevent questioning led to significantly higher later 
confidence ratings for incorrect responses in all three 
experiments, as well as for correct responses in one of the 
experiments. This finding is consistent with some 
anecdotal evidence from the legal arena that eyewitnesses 
often become more confident in their memories of a 
criminal episode as the time for testimony at trial draws 
near (and as the accumulated amount of postevent 
questioning increases).
 According to experimental research 
done to test the effects that witness preparation had on witness 
confidence: 
96
This matters in the Terry context because honest officers trying to 
recall what happened are just as likely as other witnesses to 
experience all of these memory-altering effects. And because they 
may have been involved in hundreds of similar situations by the 
time they testify in court, the details of one may be blurring into 
another. As repeat players, officers may be more, not less, 
susceptible to the creation of false memories.
 
97
                                                                                                                                  
 95 See Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: 
Assessing Their Forensic Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 817, 822 (1995) (noting 
that studies indicate that “confidence in one’s ability to make a correct identification is 
a poor predictor of identification accuracy”). 
 An officer who has 
made fifty additional traffic stops in the same stretch of highway 
or has had fifty citizen encounters in the same area of his beat 
between the time he encountered a particular defendant and the 
time he testifies, may be unable to keep the details from blending. 
As the following section explains, asking him to reduce the 
experience to a written report, one that focuses on legally relevant 
 96 John S. Shaw III & Kimberley A. McClure, Repeated Postevent Questioning Can 
Lead to Elevated Levels of Eyewitness Confidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 629 (1996). 
 97 It is possible, of course, for police officers to lie, and for judges to fail to critically 
examine their testimony. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Unnerving the Judges: Judicial 
Responsibility for the Rampart Scandal, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 787, 790-91 (2001) 
(asserting that judges sometimes “ignor[e] telltale signs that police officers fabricate 
testimony to obtain convictions. . . . include[ing] amazingly similar stories by officers 
regarding the conduct of unrelated defendants, inconsistencies in police officer reports, 
[and] dramatic recalls of memory . . . .”) (alteration in original). 
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facts, may preserve information, but may also have the additional 
effect of changing the way his memory works altogether.98
The courts’ preference for articulable experiences, and the 
practical support systems that come with that in the form of 
written reports, may actually be altering the memories of officers 
and witnesses over multiple stages. Translating a largely 
subconscious experience into Terry terms requires officers to go 
from recall of the event as a set of subjective experiences—sights, 
sounds, smells—to a set of verbalized experiences. By requiring 
officers to translate their conduct into articulable suspicion to 
meet the standard, we may have the unintended effect of 
reprogramming their memories of the event so that the standard 
we ask them to articulate actually alters the memory of the event 
to conform with the criteria. 
 
In particular, the research of psychiatrist Jonathan Schooler 
has shown that using words to describe memories can interfere 
with recall of faces or images.99 His work shows that recall favors 
the verbal description, however inaccurate it may have been 
initially, once the subject has committed to it.100 Verbal memory 
operates through a different area of the brain than visual 
memory.101 Schooler’s work has shown that committing to a verbal 
description actually changes the part of the brain that is accessed 
when recalling the event.102
                                                                                                                                  
 98 Tanja Rapus Benton et al., Eyewitness Memory Is Still Not Common Sense: 
Comparing Jurors, Judges and Law Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts, 20 APPLIED 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 115 (2006); Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, What U.S. Judges 
Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony, 18 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 427 
(2004); see also C. A. Elizabeth Luuss & Gary Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness 
Confidence: Co-Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714 (1994); 
John S. Shaw, Increases in Eyewitness Confidence Resulting from Postevent 
Questioning, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 126-46 (1996). 
 
 99 See Jonathan W. Schooler and Tonya Y. Engstler-Schooler, Verbal 
Overshadowing of Visual Memories: Some Things are Better Left Unsaid, 22 COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 36 (1990). 
 100 Id. at 37-38. 
 101 See Jonathan W. Schooler, Verbalization Produces a Transfer Inappropriate 
Processing Shift, APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 989, 992 (2002). 
 102 Id. 
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IV. WHAT POLICY IMPLICATIONS SHOULD WE DRAW FROM 
THESE INSIGHTS? 
Requiring “articulable suspicion” rather than an “inchoate 
hunch” may seem perfectly sensible to lawyers and judges—after 
all articulating is what they do.103
This objective approach leads to a host of concerns about the 
process of translating an experience in the field into testimony. 
For example, when and how does the officer learn and formulate 
the information? Can a sergeant or a supervisor help the officer to 
prepare? Can departments create and use question-driven report 
processing that drives the officer toward meeting the legal 
standard? Is this simply careful capturing of information, or does 
framing the report to meet the anticipated constitutional 
objections amount to impermissible witness coaching? Is it okay 
for the articulation to be the result of a searching inquiry by the 
prosecutor before the officer takes the stand? Can a prosecutor 
explain the rules and ask the officer to reframe his observations in 
a format recognizable to the courts? And how much will the 
process of meeting the Terry standard contaminate the officer’s 
memory of the experience itself? Scholars such as Christopher 
Slobogin have written extensively on whether current Fourth 
Amendment doctrine and the exclusionary rule create incentives 
for officers to lie.
 Do the courts mean that the 
articulation should arise before the officer acts? The answer is 
clearly no, although that would be the time most likely to regulate 
police conduct. The courts have decided that the inquiry is 
objective, not subjective, and that while the information must 
have been available to the officer at the time of the event, it need 
not have been processed by the particular officer as such. The 
question is not what this particular officer thought at the time. 
Rather, it is what a reasonable police officer using the information 
available at the time might have done. 
104
                                                                                                                                  
 103 See Lerner, supra note 40, at 29-31 (arguing that courts privilege articulate 
explanations over mere hunches, often to the detriment of the search for truth). 
 But lying, in the latter context, means that 
the officer is testifying in deliberate disregard for the truth; the 
 104 Some critics suggest that the officer is “testilying” when they alter their 
statements to conform with the requirements of reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause. Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1043 (1996). 
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officer has a true memory of the event, which he then disregards 
while testifying, in favor of a false account that will permit the 
officer to meet the constitutional standard. 
The contaminating effects of preparing to testify can also 
have a truth-distorting effect, even for honest officers and 
prosecutors. We should ask applied cognitive psychologists to 
study whether current Fourth Amendment doctrine and the 
mechanisms we have created to enforce it are causing officers to 
give subjectively true testimony regarding their encounters, i.e., 
statements that reflect their memory as they perceive it, but that 
have been altered by the process of capturing and accessing the 
information in constitutional terms. Specifically, the existing 
research begs us to consider how much the inquiry that 
prosecutors go through when preparing the witness, or even a 
witness’s anticipation of the line of questioning, alters the way the 
police officer remembers the event.105 Given that words and 
experiences often reside in different parts of the brain itself, does 
the process of writing a police report fundamentally alter the 
nature of the memory itself? Is a form that directs thinking down 
certain paths, or training that directs officers to remember things 
in certain, court-approved ways, changing the nature of the 
experience itself? Given that memory is constructed, does the way 
we apply the standard help or hurt the courts in their quest for 
accuracy?106
Once we have some answers from the applied psychologists, 
attorneys and the courts have a related set of questions to 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 105 For a review of the risks, see generally Fred C. Zacharias & Shaun Martin, 
Coaching Witnesses, 87 KY. L.J. 1001 (1999); Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Professional 
Conduct and the Preparation of Witnesses for Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations 
of ‘Coaching,’ 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 389 (1988); and Gershman, supra note 77. 
 106 While this Article is focused on the Terry inquiries, the same questions apply to 
preparation based on the elements of an offense. If one spends enough time in traffic 
court, one will hear the almost liturgical repetition of the factors that led an officer to 
administer a breathalyzer or equivalent blood alcohol test. It goes something like this: 
“I approached the vehicle and examined the subject. There was a strong odor of alcohol. 
The subject’s eyes were glassy and bloodshot. His speech was slurred and his response 
to questions was delayed, and he appeared confused. Based on these preliminary 
indicators, I chose to administer a field sobriety test, (and a field test for blood alcohol 
if appropriate in the jurisdiction), and then placed the subject under arrest, before 
transporting him to the station for the administration of a BAC test under controlled 
conditions.” I have personally seen officers give this speech, or a very close variant of it, 
on more than a dozen occasions over the course of a single day in traffic court. 
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examine. How does the administrative decision to adopt these 
methods and train law enforcement to deploy them factor into 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness? Is there some deference due 
to the executive branch in this area?107
Other observers of the Terry regime are comforted by the idea 
that even inefficient and dysfunctional judicial oversight is better 
than no oversight. Some have gone so far as to label Terry a 
“practically perfect” doctrine.
 How sure do the courts 
have to be that the officer was wrong to suppress? How should the 
burdens be allocated—legally and in reality? Are there 
technological solutions that can help us sort through these 
problems? 
108 How much comfort should we 
take if the costs are fully on the table? Has the Court stunted the 
development of alternative methods of policing the police by 
creating a false sense that there is someone watching the 
watchers?109
A. Enforcement of the Standard 
 
Courts enforce the Fourth Amendment through the 
exclusionary rule. And they have chosen to do so through a 
standard that reflects the courtroom’s inherent bias in language 
skill. But while the courts will suppress evidence, they are loath to 
find an officer to have deliberately lied. It does evoke the question: 
How do we tell the honest but inarticulate officer from the corrupt 
officer? One way to interpret the deference that underlies many of 
the opinions and practices is that the courts have a sense that 
most police officers are doing a trying and dangerous job, that it is 
experiential, and that it may be hard to translate those 
experiences into words. And the courts assume that most of the 
time the officers are acting in good faith. It seems at least possible 
that the reluctance to punish police officers for Fourth 
Amendment violations stems in part from a tacit realization that 
there are genuine but inarticulable experiences that at least some 
of these police officers have relied upon to conduct what would 
otherwise appear to be violative stops. That is, good cops, with 
                                                                                                                                  
 107 For a discussion of the deference courts show to police, see Becton, supra note 41, 
at 470-71. 
 108 See Saltzburg, supra note 4. 
 109 Levenson, supra note 97, at 790-91. 
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good street sense, have been bad at explaining why they were 
doing what they were doing.110
This reluctance to find that officers have lied may lead to 
inaction even in cases where action is warranted. In her post-
mortem of the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles, where corrupt 
police officers were framing innocent individuals, and falsifying 
testimony about others, Professor Laurie Levenson noted that 
even conscientious judges who find an officer’s testimony to be 
false in a particular case are unlikely to go beyond that.
 Judges implicitly recognize the 
memory contamination effects and the differential language skills 
of officers when they find an officer has testified incorrectly but 
not falsely. 
111
There has been a failure by judges who have witnessed 
police perjury to take meaningful action to prevent such 
misconduct in the future. A judge’s standard course of 
action when an officer has lied is to dismiss the case or 
grant a motion to suppress, and ask the prosecutors to 
report the misconduct to appropriate police internal affairs 
authorities. There is no follow-up by the court, no judicial 
reporting of the misconduct, no contempt orders, and no 
tracking of the problem officers. As a result, while a judge 
may occasionally take an interest in a particular case, 
systemic problems with corrupt police officers continue. 
 As she 
put it: 
112
                                                                                                                                  
 110 The problem I am discussing is different from the problem addressed by scholars 
such as Christopher Slobogin, who suggests that current Fourth Amendment doctrine 
and the exclusionary rule create incentives for officers to lie, and Melanie Wilson, who 
is seeking ways to empirically test this proposition. See Slobogin, supra note 104, at 
1041-48 (discussing the issue of false police testimony and indications that it occurs); 
see also David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 AM. J. 
CRIM. L. 455, 470-71 (1999) (noting that judicial opinions impugning the motives, 
honesty, or competency of police are rare); Stanley Z. Fisher, “Just the Facts, Ma’am”: 
Lying and the Omission of Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 1, 36-38 (1993) (discussing police access to exculpatory evidence and its absence 
from their reports.); Melanie D. Wilson, Judging Police LiesAn Empirical Perspective 
(Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=melanie_wilson. 
 
 111 Levenson, supra note 97, at 194. 
 112 Id. 
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VI. CAMERAS AS A SOLUTION 
As detailed above, current Fourth Amendment doctrine may 
actually encourage practices that restructure an honest officer’s 
memory in unappreciated ways. Officers are witnesses, and are 
susceptible to the same faults of memory that apply to all 
eyewitnesses, including the raft of problems associated with 
constructed memory. Because memory is constructed, the 
searching inquiry that attorneys engage in when preparing or 
cross-examining the witness may alter irreparably the way the 
police officer remembers the event. Given that words and 
experiences often reside in different parts of the brain itself, the 
process of writing a police report tailored to meet Fourth 
Amendment demands may likewise fundamentally alter the 
nature of the memory itself. Report forms that direct an officer’s 
thinking down certain paths, or training that directs officers to 
remember things in certain, court-approved ways, may change the 
nature of the experience itself because officers have their 
attention directed and constrained. 
Given these dangers, a new approach is warranted. 
Reasonable and articulable suspicion, the traditional Terry 
standard, should be reframed more broadly, as reasonable 
suspicion supported by credible evidence. Articulable suspicion is 
only a subset of a larger category, based on the reasonableness 
more generally. The important issue is whether the courts are 
able to meaningfully engage in oversight of the police and remain 
capable of protecting the citizenry’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
The courts should be able to make that determination based on 
any available evidence. Oral testimony is only one way to make 
the officer’s action amenable to judicial review, which is the 
purpose of the exercise. 
We are now entering the age of widespread deployment of 
cameras in police cars and even on police officers themselves.113
                                                                                                                                  
 113 Every state police agency has used some form of video recording system in patrol 
cars and the International Association of Chiefs of Police estimates that nearly half of 
police cars are equipped with a video camera. Matthew D. Thurlow, Lights, Camera, 
Action: Video Cameras as Tools of Justice, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
771, 795 (2005). For an extensive discussion of the use of officer-mounted cameras, see 
David A. Harris, How Accountability-Based Policing Can Reinforce—Or Replace—The 
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 149, 175-80 (2009). Civil 
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Cameras are everywhere, and an increasing number of 
departments and prosecutors have worked through the logistics of 
using police cameras. With the widespread use of ever-cheaper 
digital video, it is now clear that the costs of deploying cameras 
can be managed,114 and that protocols for handling discovery 
issues can be developed.115
One objection to the use of video is cost, but the price of the 
technology to capture and store video is dropping steadily and 
should continue to drop as more vendors enter the market.
 Given the hidden costs of the current 
regime, states should consider adopting policies that mandate the 
use of video. 
116
Some of the more difficult obstacles to the adoption of video 
remain cultural. Right now, many departments and police chiefs 
are comfortable with video so long as they can decide when it is 
used—to make cases and to protect their departments from false 
liability claims. But the video has the potential to act as a double-
edged sword. There will be uses of police video in court not only for 
departments when they are falsely accused of violating a suspect’s 
rights or as evidence against defendants, but also against the 
police when officers have in fact violated defendants’ rights, or the 
 
Cross-adoption of technology should also help. Anyone who has 
purchased a smartphone in the last two years had the option of 
purchasing one that recorded and transmitted video clips. Once it 
becomes clear that there is a large enough market for a robust, 
officer-worn video-recording device, competitors who have 
developed hardware expertise in these other contexts will enter 
the market, driving costs down even further. 
                                                                                                                                  
libertarians have not been comfortable with cameras for other reasons, so their use will 
remain controversial. For a discussion of the mechanics of digital camera deployment in 
a broader context—and a critical view of widespread use of cameras without Fourth 
Amendment regulation, see CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW 
GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 81-110 (2007); Christopher 
Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to 
Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213 (2002); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the 
Twenty-First Century: Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 125, 152 (2002). 
 114 Thurlow, supra note 113, at 797. 
 115 I anticipate that the cameras will produce what will be another form of digital 
evidence. See generally Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal 
Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279 (2005) (discussing potential protocols for managing 
digital evidence). 
 116 Thurlow, supra note 113, at 797. 
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video is used as evidence by defense counsel in unforeseen 
ways.117 Departments that resist the deployment of cameras are 
more worried about the perceived downside than the upside.118
One underexplored upside is the one this Article explores. 
There is plenty of doctrinal room within current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence for the use of digital video as a 
supplement to, or substitute for, police testimony. Using video will 
also allow the new science on facial expression to be considered, 
while subjecting it to judicial oversight, expert reexamination, and 
public scrutiny. Having video available will also reduce the 
problems with memory contamination explored above by 
permitting officers to examine the video before testifying and 
hopefully them from locking in to a verbal formulation of the event 
that may not reflect reality. It should also simplify life for 
prosecutors and defense attorneys. It will make cases based on 
good stops easier to prove, and bad cases easier to weed out. This 
rise in quality will lead to an increase in pretrial resolutions in 




                                                                                                                                  
 117 A 2004 study by the International Association of Chiefs of Police demonstrated 
that ninety-seven percent of U.S. citizens responding to a poll supported the use of in-
car cameras for law enforcement. Colonel Thomas Hutchins, In-Car Cameras: 
Executive Summary, in IACP/COPS TECHNOLOGY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM: 
TECHNOLOGY DESK REFERENCE 47 (2010) (“While law enforcement views the 
acquisition of camera technology as a means to demonstrate their professionalism and 
increase officer safety, the public views cameras as a means to guard against abuse. 
Despite the difference in opinions, both the public and the police support use of the 
technology making the acquisition and implementation of an in-car camera program a 
win/win proposition for all.”). 
 Finally, video evidence will empower judges 
to act in cases where officers are truly lying because it will obviate 
the swearing contest between a police officer and an accused 
criminal, and give judges much firmer footing on which to stand. 
 118 Of course, for outsiders, accurate assessments of officer conduct are likely to be 
seen as all upside, whether the camera reveals that the officer was good or bad. 
 119 This article is focused on the costs and benefits of the Terry regime. Cameras 
have multiple other benefits for law enforcement. For example, they can provide clear 
evidence in criminal trials and civil suits, resolve disciplinary complaints against 
officers, allow oversight and training by supervisors, and increase public confidence 
that officers are accountable. For further exploration of these issues, see David Harris, 
Picture This: Body Worn Video (“Head Cams”) As Tools For Ensuring Fourth 
Amendment Compliance By Police, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 357 (2010) (discussing the 
various contexts in which video evidence would be useful). 
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Whether and to what extent the evidentiary rules should 
require video before permitting certain kinds of testimony, such as 
the testimony on facial expression, remain open questions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has outlined some of the unexplored costs of the 
Terry regime, built on the requirement of reasonable and 
articulable suspicion. The current regime has flaws as practiced, 
and a range of challenges coming that it must face. Research on 
witness memory has demonstrated that there are contamination 
effects that are a byproduct of the way we now practice Fourth 
Amendment law. New pressures on the Terry regime are coming 
from other directions as well. The federal government and the 
police are training officers in new techniques based on advances in 
cognitive and behavioral science that rely on officer observation of 
suspect behavior, much of it subtle and operating in ways that the 
suspects themselves do not realize. Inevitably, officers relying on 
the new techniques will be bringing them into the courtroom, 
where the doctrine will be forced to adapt. Terry as now practiced 
may be giving us a false sense of security, while failing in two 
directions simultaneously. It creates the sense that the courts are 
meaningfully engaged in police oversight, leaving it less likely 
that other administrative oversight methods will be adopted. The 
current formulation may also be limiting perceptions about the 
appropriate use of evidence in some subset of cases where a good, 
but inarticulate officer engages in a search that we would like to 
take place, and has the evidence suppressed because he is 
inarticulate about his reasonable suspicion. Technology is also 
increasing the range of evidence that is available to the courts 
when deciding if officers acted reasonably. Rather than relying on 
witness testimony alone, digital video is subjecting a wide range of 
heretofore unavailable behavior to the courts. It is time to move 
beyond the Terry formulation of the basis for police frisks. By 
explicitly adopting a new standardreasonable suspicion 
supported by credible evidencethe courts can make clear that 
there is doctrinal room for technology, in the form of cameras 
today and perhaps in other forms tomorrow, to help ameliorate 
the limitations of human memory, while allowing society the 
benefit of other advances in our knowledge of cognitive science. 
